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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY: A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
THE ISSUE OF STANDING
John J. Barrett III*
URUGUAYAN AUTHORiTIES arrested Ramon Puentes on February 17,
1991 on several narcotics charges.' The United States then requested the
Uruguayan Government extradite Puentes to stand trial for conspiracy to
import cocaine into the United States.2 The extradition request stated that
the United States intended to charge Puentes with conspiracy dating from
1982 until November 29, 1988. The Uruguayan government granted the
extradition request pursuant to an extradition treaty between the United
States and Uruguay.4 On September 30, 1991, Puentes was arraigned
before a U.S. magistrate
On December 13, 1991, a grand jury returned a supervening indict-
ment charging Puentes with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United
States from 1982 to December 13, 1991.6 This increased the period
during which the United States alleged that Puentes conspired to violate
U.S. drug laws by three years. On May 21, 1992, a jury found Puentes
guilty as to the supervening indictment.7
Puentes subsequently filed a post-conviction motion for the arrest of
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, arguing that the
United States violated the doctrine of specialty' under which a "nation
that receives a criminal defendant pursuant to an extradition treaty may
try the defendant on those offenses for which the other nation granted
* B.A. University of Massachusetts 1993; J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law 1997; Editor in Chief Canada - United States Law Journal
1997; Notes Editor Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1997. The
author wishes to thank Professor Kevin C. McMunigal for his assistance.
United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1995).
2 Id. at 1569
3Id.
4 Id. at 1569-70.
5 Id. at 1570.
6 Id.
7Id.
Id. at 1571; FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (regarding the production of documents and
entry upon land for inspection).
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extradition."9 Puentes also filed a motion to enjoin his sentence.' On
December 22, 1992, the court rejected these motions, and Puentes subse-
quently appealed." In United States v. Puentes, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the United States did not violate the doctrine
of specialty. 2 But, the Court further held that in upholding the Court's
prior decision in United States v. Rauscher, Puentes had standing to assert
that the United States violated specialty. 3
The federal courts are widely divided on the question of whether an
individual should be given standing to assert a violation of specialty.
Although not all circuits grant individuals standing to assert violations of
specialty, those that do almost uniformly base their decisions on
Rauscher. This Note addresses whether individuals should have standing
in U.S. courts to assert violations of specialty. Part I explores the limited
role individuals have played in the international law forum in challenging
treaty violations. Part II reviews the genesis of extradition during the last
350 years. Part III argues that the Rauscher court departed from estab-
lished law without offering a rationale for its holding. It also illustrates
that Rauscher is internally inconsistent because it quotes language from
the Head Money Cases about treaties expressly conferring rights upon
individuals, but fails to examine the treaty in question before resolving
9 Id. at 1572.
10 Id. at 1571.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 1576.
13 Id. at 1572. The court stated that "Rauscher establish[ed] that when personal
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant is obtained through extradition proceedings, the
defendant may invoke the provisions of the relevant extradition treaty in order to
challenge the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1573.
The rationale for the doctrine rests on the following factors which bear on the re-
questing and requested states:
(1) the requested state could have refused extradition if it had known that the
relator would be prosecuted or punished for an offense other than the one for
which extradition was granted.
(2) the requesting state would not have in personam jurisdiction over the relator,
if not for the requested state's surrender of that person.
(3) the requesting state would be abusing the formal process of the requested state
in securing the surrender of the person for reasons other than the ones disclosed
in the extradition request.
(4) the requested state used its processes in reliance upon the representations made
by the requesting state and is entitled to the observance of these representations.
(5) the relator is entitled to be tried for the crime or crimes for which he was
extradited and thus to be free from prosecutorial abuse once he is within the
jurisdictional control of a requested state.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACricE 433 (3d ed. 1996).
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the issue. Part IV contends that a separation of powers conflict arises
when U.S. courts give individuals standing to assert violations of special-
ty. Finally, part V proposes that individuals be given standing to assert
violations of specialty only when the provisions of the applicable extra-
dition treaty expressly authorize such a right.
I. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FORUM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The doctrine of specialty and the issue of whether individuals have
standing to assert its violation have caused considerable discord in the
lower courts of the United States. For instance, the First, Second, Third,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that individuals do not have stand-
ing to assert violations of specialty. 4 These circuits practice what is
called political realism with respect to treaty law."5 The realists' main
"' See United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that
treaties are made for the benefit of signatory nations and that under international law
the contracting foreign government, not the defendant, has the right to complain about
a violation of a treaty.); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) ("As
a matter of international law, the principle of specialty has been viewed as a privilege
of the asylum state, designed to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right
accruing to the accused.'); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1301 (3d. Cir.
1991) (stating that "the mere existence of a treaty does not create individual rights in
fugitives found within the borders of a party's nation."); United States v. Kaufman, 858
F.2d 994, 1007 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249,
(5th Cir. 1988) ("Where no party to a treaty protests a treaty violation, an individual
lacks standing to raise the treaty as a basis for challenging the court's jurisdiction.'));
United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that "a criminal
defendant has no standing to argue the specialty doctrine when the asylum state has
failed to raise an objection to the proceeding"); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,
584 (6th Cir. 1985) ('he right to insist on the application of the principle of specialty
belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested.');
see also Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("It is clear
that the concept of extradition has certain well-defined parameters. One such limitation
is the "rule of specialty," a principle of international law that prohibits the requesting
country from prosecuting or punishing the extradited party without the permission of the
surrendering country for any offense committed prior to his extradition, except that for
which he was extradited."); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.
1990) ("It is well-established that individuals have no standing to challenge violations
of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereigns involved ....
[Elven where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state -
such as fishing rights - it is traditionally held that "any rights arising from such
provisions are only derivative through the states.").
" See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Comment, Standing to Allege Violations of the
Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship between the Individual and
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
concern is that stability and peace are maintained between nations, and
they adopt the view that states are the only subjects of international
law. 1
6
On the other hand, under certain circumstances, the Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow individuals to assert violations of
specialty. The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits afford individuals
standing only when the requested state can allege such a violation. 7
Under this approach, the individual's right to assert a violation is deriva-
tive of the requested state."8 However, the requested state can nullify the
individual's objection to specialty by consenting to the additional
charges.19 In the Tenth circuit, individuals have the right to assert viola-
tions of specialty regardless whether the requested sovereign can raise a
violation of the doctrine. ° Although these circuits differ slightly as to
the circumstances under which individuals shall acquire standing, their un-
derlying legal justification for granting standing is almost uniformly
grounded in United States v. Rauscher.2'
the Sovereign, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1187, 1196 (1995) ("Individuals play no role in this
[realist] model, and accordingly, they can derive very few rights from treaties. Unless
a treaty explicitly provides individuals with enforcement rights, such rights do not
exist.").
16 See id.
,7 See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1571 (lth Cir. 1995) (holding that
individuals have standing to allege violations of specialty only when the surrendering
state can also allege such a violation); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721
(11th Cir. 1989) (stating that the individual has standing to allege any violation the
extraditing state may consider a breach of the extradition treaty); United States v.
Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that individuals have standing to
raise whatever violations that the surrendering state may raise); Leigbnor v. Turner, 884
F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that the defendant's right to allege violations of
specialty is strictly derivative); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir.
1987) (stating that the individual can raise whatever objections the extraditing state can
allege).
,s See Leighnor, 884 F.2d at 389.
,9 See Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Mak-
ing Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 138 (1993).
' See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing
Rauscher which stated that the doctrine of specialty is a "right conferred upon persons
brought from a foreign country into this [country]").
2, See Puentes, 50 F.3d at 1573 ("Rauscher demonstrates that even in the absence
of a protest from the requested state, an individual extradited pursuant to a treaty has
standing to challenge the court's personal jurisdiction under the rule of specialty.');
Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422 (citing Rauscher for the proposition that the individual can
raise the same objections that a requested state may raise); Levy, 905 F.2d at 328 n.1
(stating that "Rauscher gave extradited defendants a right to claim the [doctrine of
302 [Vol. 29:299
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At the center of the debate is the individual's role in international
law. There are two schools of thought on this subject, one narrow, the
other broad. Courts adhering to the horizontal or realist view argue that
states, not individuals, play a role in international law.' This well-estab-
lished narrow view argues that signatory nations are the beneficiaries of
extradition treaties.'s By extension, individuals do not have standing to
assert violations of extradition treaties specifically including the doctrine
of specialty.2
specialty's] ... protection"); Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151 (citing Rauscher for the proposi-
tion that individuals have standing to allege violations of the doctrine of specialty).
" See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,
100 YALE LJ. 2277, 2297 (1991) ("Under the horizontal view, the proper subjects of
international law are the states themselves. Individuals do not have rights; if they are
protected, it is only because states have chosen to act on their behalf."). Those who
embrace the horizontal view argue that "the equality and dignity of sovereign states
would be compromised if states were sued by private parties . ... [UIntemational law
imposes duties and confers rights only upon states, its sole 'subjects."' HENRY J.
STENER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATiONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 244-45 (3rd ed.
1986); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L. 2347, 2349 n.10 (1991) (stating that "[t]he [dualist] school . . . denies a meaning-
ful role to both individuals and domestic courts .... [Individuals injured by foreign
states . . . have no right to pursue claims directly against those states in either the do-
mestic or international fora. Instead, their states . . . pursue those claims for them on
a discretionary basis . . .
2 See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 2295; see L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
19 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (stating that "[slince the Law of Nations is based
on the common consent of individual States, States are the principle subjects of Interna-
tional Law.. .. As a rule, the subjects of... the Law of Nations are States solely
and exclusively."); Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's
Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 102
(1985) (stating that Jeremy Bentham's "phrase 'international law' . . . seemed to call
for an exclusive state-oriented view of that body of law."); see generally BAssIoUNI,
supra note 13, at 391 ("Extradition is still regarded primarily as an instrument of
interstate cooperation designed to inure to the benefit of the interested state.").
24
The reason that horizontal conceptions of international law typically structure cases in
such a way that, they fail the standing requirement is that under the horizontal view,
rights belong to states and not to individuals. This is true even when an individual has
suffered in some way from the violation. Two consequences follow from this proposi-
tion. First, an individual coming into court requesting relief is really asserting the rights
of a third party, rather than personal rights, because only a state can be a legal rights
holder. Second, the court cannot grant effective relief. The appropriate relief (under a
horizontal view) would be to the state, because the state is the rights holder. However,
if the suit is initiated by an individual, no remedy granted to the individual would
redress what is, supposedly, the real international wrong. In order to satisfy standing
requirements, the rights holder must be the individual initiating litigation.
30319971
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On the other hand, courts applying the vertical approach, permit in-
dividuals a more active role in international law.' Consistent with this
approach is the presupposition that the individual, as a rights holder, can
initiate judicial action.' The challenge to the horizontal view is attribut-
ed primarily to a humanitarian concern for individuals' human rights that
are not protected when individuals must rely exclusively on their states
for protectionY
II. EXTRADITION TREATIES
Extradition is the process by which an accused or convicted individu-
al, "located in one country is surrendered to another country for trial and
punishment."' Throughout history, there has been much debate over
whether one sovereign nation owes another a legal duty to return fugi-
tives upon request.
There are primarily two theories under which sovereign nations have
historically justified extradition: comity and treaty.29 In pre-modern times,
nations often returned fugitives without having the legal obligation to do
so by treaty as a "matter of courtesy and goodwill." Exchanges such
as these were perceived to be an integral element of "friendly relations
between sovereigns, and sometimes such acts were performed without
solicitation."' This practice is referred to as comity.
Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 2302.
' Vertical refers to the inter-relationship between states and individuals. Brilmayer
argues that international law governs more than just inter-state relations. In her opinion,
both states and individuals have rights. See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 2295-96.
Brilmayer argues that "the vertical approach is really an expansion of the horizontal
model ... .When it is brought to bear on domestic litigation of international issues,
however, it . . . elevate[s] vertical elements of litigation over horizontal ele-
ments . . . ." Id. at 2296.
' See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 2298.
2 See generally PHILLIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 90-91 (1948)
(describing the position of individuals in international law in relation to fundamental
human rights and state protection).
28 DEPT. OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
690 (1980).
29 See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 49-53 (discussing extradition by
comity and treaty).
30 Id. at 1.
31 Id. at 2; see United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) ("It is only
in modem times that nations ... have imposed upon themselves the obligation of
delivering up ...fugitives from justice to the States where their crimes were commit-
ted .. . . Prior to [extradition] ...treaties, there was no well-defined obligation on
one country to deliver up such fugitives to another, and though such delivery was often
made, it was upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the govern-
304 [Vol. 29:299
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Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth century philosopher-scholar, wrote
extensively on the subject of extradition and the legal obligations nations
had with respect thereto. In his view, the asylum state should either
punish the accused or convicted individual or return him to the nation
from which he fled 2
[Any sovereign state... has a right to require another power to punish
any of its subjects ... , a right essential to the dignity and security of
all governments.33
[lIt is [therefore] necessary that the power, in whose kingdom an
offender resides should upon the complaint of the aggrieved party, either
punish him itself, or deliver him up to the discretion of the party.6
Emerich de Vattel, an eighteenth century scholar, took a different
position with respect to extradition. He wrote that states had an absolute
duty under international law to surrender fugitives to the states from
which they fled.35
The modem approach to extradition does not comport with either
Vattel's "absolute duty" theory or Grotius' theory of "prosecute or
surrender." Under the modem approach, sovereign nations are legally
obliged to return accused or convicted criminals to the state from which
they fled only when a treaty mandates such action.' In 1840, the United
States gave legal effect to the modem approach in Holmes v. Jennison?
In that case, the Court stated:
Since the expiration of the [extradition] treaty with Great Britain....
the general government appears to have adopted the policy of refusing
to surrender persons, who, having committed offenses in a foreign
nation, have taken shelter in this .... [I]n every instance where there
was no engagement by treaty to deliver, and a demand has been made,
[the United States] uniformly refused, and have denied the right of the
ment.. . ."); OPPENHEIM, supra note 23 at 34-35.
'2 See HUGO GROTIUs, 2 THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 21, §§ 3-4 (A.C.
Campbell A.M. trans., M. Walter Dunne Publishing ed. 1979).
33 Id. § 3.
' Id. § 4.; see also HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181
(8th ed. 1866) (stating that Grotius' views were espoused by scholars like Heineccius,
Burlemaqui, Vattel, Rutherford, Schmelzing, and Kent).
See BAssIouN, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADMON: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 7 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter BASsIouNi (2d ed.)].
3 See id.
' Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
30519971
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executive to surrender, because there was no treaty, and no law of
Congress to authorize it. And acting upon this principle throughout, they
have never demanded from a foreign government any one who fled
from this country in order to escape from the punishment due to his
crimes.
By extension, the Court concluded that no legal duty to extradite fugitives
exists absent the existence of an extradition treaty.3 9
Extradition can generally be divided into three substantive parts:
extraditable offenses, double criminality, and the doctrine of specialty.'
These "protections have been included in international extradition trea-
ties... because systems of justice may vary widely between treaty
signatories."'"
Extraditable offenses are those criminal offenses enumerated in an
extradition treaty for which one signatory will return a fugitive to the
other signatory.42 Such offenses are usually serious in nature and carry
a prison sentence of more than one year.43
Double criminality refers to the concept that an offense alleged
against an individual by a requesting state must also constitute an offense
under the laws of the requested state." Two methods are used to inter-
pret the double criminality requirement, in concreto and in abstracto.45
The former method "relies on the label of the offense and a strict inter-
pretation of its legal elements." The latter method "relies on the crimi-
nality of the activity regardless of its specific label and full concordance
of its elements in the respective laws of the two states."47
-' Id. at 574.
39 Id. at 578-79 (stating that the treaty-making power of the Constitution is compe-
tent to bind the states to surrender fugitives from justice where such power is executed
by a treaty, but while such power remains dormant or contingent, the obligation does
not exist); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
40 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 383-493 (discussing the substantive require-
ments of extradition including: reciprocity, double criminality, extraditable offenses, and
specialty).
4, Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and
Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1022 n.27 (1992) (quoting Brief
for Amicus Curiae Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
42 See id.
4 See id.
44 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 388.





The doctrine of specialty places certain constraints upon a state
requesting the extradition of a fugitive. The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States defines specialty as follows:
(1) A person who has been extradited to another state will not, unless
the requested state consents, (a) be tried by the requesting state for an
offense other than one for which he was extradited; or, (b) be given
punishment more severe than was provided by the applicable law of the
requesting state at the time of the request for extradition. (2) A person
who has been extradited to another state for trial and has been acquitted
of the charges for which he was extradited must be given a reasonable
opportunity to depart from the state.'
In essence, the doctrine of specialty "reflects a fundamental concern of
governments that persons who are surrendered should not be subject to
indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government ... ."' The
U.S. Supreme Court did not, however, recognize the doctrine of specialty
until it decided Rauscher in 18860
III. THE RAUSCHER OPINION
On October 9, 1884, William Rauscher, second mate of the J.F.
Chapman, murdered Janssen while on the high seas within U.S. maritime
jurisdiction Rauscher was subsequently charged with murder, however,
he fled to Great Britain before the United States could take him into
custody. 2
Under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, the United States and
Great Britain set forth certain conditions under which each party was
obliged to return fugitives upon request of the other.5 In accordance
with this treaty, the United States requested Great Britain extradite
Rauscher to stand trial in the United States for murder.5 Great Britain
complied s
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch.
7, § 477 (1987).
49 United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (lth Cir. 1995) (quoting Fiocconi
v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 1972).
' United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 407, 419 (1886) (stating that "[a] trea-
ty . .. is a law of the land, as [is] an act of Congress ...
sI Id. at 409.
52 Id. at 408.
53 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 10, 8 Stat. 572, 579.
' Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 408.
55 Id.
30719971
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When the United States took Rauscher into custody, however, the
murder charge was dropped and he was then charged with assaulting and
inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment" upon Janssen. 6 The Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York subse-
quently found Rauscher guilty, but could not decide whether the "prison-
er, under the extradition treaty with Great Britain, having been surren-
dered upon a charge of murder, acquire[d] a right to be exempt from
prosecution . . . ."' To resolve this dispute, the court certified to the
U.S. Supreme Court a request that it decide whether inter alia a person
extradited for one crime, pursuant to an extradition treaty, may by tried
and convicted of another."
On December 6, 1886, Justice Miller delivered the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion that Rauscher indeed had standing to raise specialty. 9
Absent from this opinion, however, is any discussion regarding the
individual's limited role in international law. Moreover, Justice Miller
failed to discuss the separation of powers dilemma implicit in the Court's
decision to give individuals standing to assert treaty violations notwith-
standing executive disapproval. Further, Justice Miller did not address the
possibility that permitting individuals to exercise such a right could
interfere with the executive's ability to conduct foreign relations. Instead
of providing a detailed analysis in support of his position, Justice Miller
failed to justify his significant departure from his earlier opinion in Head
Money Cases which was itself inconsistent with Rauscher.
A. Head Money Cases
Justice Miller began his Rauscher opinion by stating that the doctrine
of specialty is a general principle of law.' He proceeded to hold that
individuals have standing to assert its violation.6 This was a significant
6 Id. Not only did the United States charge Rauscher with a crime other than that
for which Great Britain granted extradition, the crime for which he was charged was
not one of the crimes enumerated in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Id. at 410-11.
17 Id. at 409.
5s Id. at 410.
'9 Id. at 430-31 (stating that upon a writ of habeas corpus, federal courts can
decide whether an individual is being held in violation of an extradition treaty, and
rejecting the notion that redress could only be found in the executive branch).
6 Id.; see also STERNER & VAGTs, supra note 22, at 321-22 (stating that general
principles of law refer "to principles of general significance in the legal systems of
most civilized or developed countries."); OPPENHEim, supra note 23, at 29-31 (stating
that "intention of the phrase is to authorize the [International Court of Justice] to apply
the general principles of municipal jurisprudence").
6 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418.
[Vol. 29-.299
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departure from what was thought to be the individual's proper role in
international law. 2 Justice Miller's weak rationalization of the above
conclusion prompted one commentator to opine that "Miller was not
merely guilty of unartful drafting; it appears that he was attempting to
finesse his way out of a doctrinal predicament of his own making."
The predicament is Justice Miller's Head Money Cases opinion where he
stated that absent specific treaty language to the contrary, individuals
cannot allege treaty violations."
Head Money Cases involved a dispute between a firm that arranged
transportation of passengers between Holland and the United States and
a U.S. Customs Officer at the Port of New York.' The dispute con-
cerned a Congressional act entitled, "An Act to Regulate Immigration,"
enacted August 3, 1882 which authorized a fifty cent duty on all passen-
gers entering the United States through the Port of New York.' The
defendant firm argued that the act violated several treaty provisions extant
between the United States and other "friendly nations." 7 The Court held,
however, that the act did not violate any treaties.'
B. Rauscher. Internally Inconsistent
Although Head Money Cases did not concern the operation of an
extradition treaty or a criminal defendant's standing to raise specialty,
Justice Miller imported language from that case into his Rauscher opin-
ion. It is this language, and its use in Rauscher justifying rather than
denying standing, that weakens Rauscher's holding. Justice Miller wrote
as follows:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of
the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction
becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so
far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end
be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial
courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.'
Cf. The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. 102, 104 (1815).
Semmelman, supra note 19, at 110.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
5 Id. at 587-88.
6 Id. at 589.
67 Id. at 597.
61 Id. at 597-601.
' Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886) (emphasis added).
1997]
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He concluded as follows:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal
law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in
the courts of the country.. . .The Constitution of the United States
places such provisions as these in the same category as other laws of
Congress, by its declaration that "this Constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."70
With the above in mind, it is necessary to examine the relevant
provisions of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to see whether "certain rights
are conferred upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations ...
to assert specialty." An examination of Article 10 which deals exclusive-
ly with extradition, clearly confers no private rights of action to assert
violations of specialty.' In fact, Article 10 makes no reference to indi-
vidual rights at all. Justice Miller, by way of legerdemain, argued for a
textual approach to treaty construction and proceeded to ignore that ap-
proach entirely by granting Rauscher standing absent specific treaty lan-
guage providing such a right. For this reason, Rauscher should not be
relied upon for the proposition that individuals necessarily have standing
to assert specialty.
0 Id. at 418-19 (emphasis added).
7 Id. Article 10 of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty states, in relevant part
Mhe United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them,
... respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the
crime of murder ... , committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum,
or shall be found, within the territories of the other, provided that this shall only be
done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where
the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and
commitment for trial, if the crime or offense had there been committed; and the
respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have power,
jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the
apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such
judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may
be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to
sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify
the same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender
of such fugitive.
Id. at 410-11.
' Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 State. 572 (entered
into force Oct. 13, 1842, amended in 1925 at 44 Stat. 2100).
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Assuming arguendo that Rauscher's premise is correct, the provisions
of an extradition treaty, such as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, expressly
authorizing individuals standing to assert its breach are required. Justice
Miller highlighted this point in Rauscher by stating that "a treaty may
contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or sub-
jects... which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in
the courts of the country." Comparing this language with that used in
United States v. Puentes, however, shows the danger inherent in reliance
on Rauscher's holding alone. Puentes stated that "Rauscher establish[ed]
that when personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant is obtained
through extradition proceedings, the defendant may invoke the provisions
of the relevant extradition treaty in order to challenge the court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction."74 The court continued by asserting that courts
that do not allow individuals to assert treaty violations ignore both the
history of extradition and the mandate of Rauscher.75 However, Justice
Miller did not clearly justify his departure from established precedent,
leaving Rauscher something less than a mandate. Moreover, legal scholar-
ship supports the conclusion that individuals should only be able to act
through their respective governments.76 Therefore, courts holding other-
wise ignore both the analytical shortcomings of Rauscher, the history of
extradition law, and the individual's circumscribed role in international
law.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Although Justice Miller wrote that Rauscher had standing to raise
specialty, he failed to justify this result analytically. Notwithstanding the
above observation, individuals should be denied standing on other grounds
as well. Extradition treaties are essentially contracts between two or more
nations, each seeking to acquire benefits that accrue by virtue of the
contractual relationship2' Allowing the judiciary to interfere with such
7 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418.
' Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 1574.
76 See BASSiOuNI (2d ed.), supra note 36, at 49-50.
' See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1929) ("A treaty is in its
nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act."); Washington v. Washing-
ton Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 US. 658, 675 (1979) (stating that
"[a] treaty . . . is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations.");
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("As treaties are contracts between
independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning ... );
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1912) ("But it is urged that treaties are to
be liberally construed. Like other contracts, they are to be read in the light of
conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view
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an arrangement by giving individuals standing absent specific treaty
language granting such a right weakens certain prerogatives inherent in
the executive branch of the U.S. government.78
to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting."); United States
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906) (stating that in entering
into international agreements, it is assured Congress has carefully considered the costs
of the agreement in light of the benefits).
Judicial interference in treaties can weaken executive prerogatives. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ...."). This grant of power, coupled
with Article HI, § 3 vests in the Executive Branch the power to conduct foreign
relations. This power is exclusive in that neither the legislature nor the judiciary are
empowered to conduct foreign relations. See U.S. CONST. art. mn, § 3; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 ('The conduct of the foreign relations of our
Government is committed ...to the Executive and the Legislative - "the political"
Departments . . . ."). Although not always immediately apparent, allowing the federal
judiciary to decide when an individual should be given standing to allege the violation
of an extradition treaty can create foreign relations problems.
Not only ...is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character
different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power
is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as
a representative of the nation. As Marshall said in his great argument on March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). See also
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 325 (1937) (stating "[tihis court held that the
conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political depart-
ments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision ...."); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The crucial element
of the separation of powers ...is the principal that the conduct of foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative
- "the political" Departments." Separation of powers stands for the "proper - and
properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society, a role that includes
judicial respect not only for the coordinate branches of the national government but
also for the other governmental members of the federal system."); Haitian Refugee Ctr.
v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 805 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that the separation of




A. Conduct of Foreign Relations
Judicial activism in treaty enforcement can detrimentally affect the
president's ability to conduct foreign relations. 9 These dangers are well
presented by Judge Robert Bork in his Tel-Oren opinion.
The potential for interference with governments conducting their foreign
relations is central to both separation of powers limits on jurisdiction
and to international law's general refusal to grant private rights of
action. The existence of such a potential in any case must count strong-
ly against international law's providing a private right of action .... .'
If this power is ceded to the federal judiciary, treaties, and by extension,
foreign relations, could become vulnerable to overreaching in an area
constitutionally reserved for the executive branch." In other words, U.S.
' For lack of a more illustrative definition, judicial conferral of standing is referred
to as judicial activism. This captures the essence of such practice in that absent express
language in the extradition treaty, federal courts remain under an obligation to construe
treaties - not to rewrite them. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 72
(1821). Justice Story declared that "this Court is bound to give effect to the stipulations
of the treaty in the manner and to the extent which the parties have declared, and not
otherwise." Id. at 72.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805.
8, To many, this argument may seem counter-intuitive. For instance, it can be
argued that two parties enter into an extradition treaty [contractual arrangement] to
provide certainty that would not exist in the absence of the treaty. In this narrow
sense, the existence of such a treaty implies that the signatories want it enforced. How-
ever, this is too simple an argument, and fails to consider basic principles of contract
law. In contract law, as well as treaty law, it is incumbent upon the non-breaching
party to challenge the breach. "[Wihere a party fails to perform a promise, it is im-
portant to determine if the breach is material. If the breach is material, the aggrieved
party may cancel the contract. However he also has the option of continuing with the
contract ... ." JOHN D. CALAMARi & JOSEPH M. PERLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS
458 (3d ed. 1987) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32,
38 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Shapiro, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 994, 1301 (3rd. Cir. 1991); United States v. Kaufman, 858
F.2d 994, 1006-09 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.
1994); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985); Berenguer v.
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990). Choosing not to enforce a treaty's provision is similar
to making an election not to enforce a contract once breached. "The word election
signifies a choice, one that is often binding on the party that makes it. When the time
for occurrence of a condition has expired, the party whose duty is conditional has a
choice. That party can take advantage of the nonoccurrence of the condition and treat
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conduct of foreign relations, as constitutionally determined by the presi-
dent, could be made contingent upon the federal judiciary's interpretation
of relevant terms of extradition treaties, irrespective of the signatory's
intentions not to enforce those terms. If the federal judiciary decided that
an extradition treaty can be challenged by individuals, without considering
the actual text of the treaty or the intent of the signatories, the president's
ability to conduct foreign relations could be jeopardized, if not devastat-
ed.82 To underscore the danger, consider the following hypothetical sce-
nario.
The Extradition Treaty Between"the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (Extradition Treaty) does not expressly confer stand-
ing on the individual to allege its violation." On January 1, 1998, an
Israeli national (the Bomber), who was also a member of a fundamentalist
Jewish organization intent on halting peace negotiations between the State
of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), blew up a
mosque in New York City killing three people." Before being appre-
hended by U.S. authorities, the Bomber fled to London where he was
subsequently apprehended by British authorities.
On January 5, 1998, the U.S. State Department formally asked the
British government to extradite the Bomber. However, during negotiations
leading to the formal extradition request, Britain stated that such a request
would be granted pursuant to the Extradition Treaty if the United States
the duty as discharged or can disregard the nonoccurrence of the condition and treat
the duty as unconditional. Courts often hold that a party that chooses to disregard the
nonoccurrence of a condition is bound by an election to treat the duty as uncondition-
al .... " E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 590 (3d ed. 1990).
1 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (stating that "the meaning given
[to treaties] by the departments of government ... charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is given great weight").
3 Article XII provides, as follows:
(1) A person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against in the territory of the
requesting Party for any offense other than an extraditable offense established by the
facts in respect to which his extradition has been granted, or on account of any other
matters, nor be extradited by that Party to a third state- (a) until after he has returned
to the territory of the requested Party; or (b) until the expiration of thirty days after he
has been free to return to the territory of the requested Party. (2) The provisions of
paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply to offenses committed, or matters arising,
after the extradition.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Extradition, Oct. 21, 1976, U.S.-
U.K., art. xii, 28 U.S.T. 227, 233 (1977).
8' For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the Executive Department decided
that a Middle East peace treaty between the state of Israel and the P.L.O. is of
primary importance to the security of the region and U.S. national security.
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formally charged the Bomber only with the unlawful discharge of explo-
sives. Britain's negotiators added this condition because they were concur-
rently concluding negotiations with Israel for the extradition of an Irish
Republican Army (I.R.A.) terrorist sought for the bombing of a pub
where three British soldiers were killed. Britain believed that if the
Bomber was extradited for murder, Israel would refuse to extradite the
I.R.A. terrorist. The United States reluctantly agreed, but with the under-
standing that Britain would not object to the Bomber being charged with
murder sometime after Israel extradited the I.R.A. terrorist. Britain agreed.
However, this was not made public as doing so would jeopardize the
agreement. Nor was it made public that the United States promised Yassir
Arafat that the United States would charge the Bomber with murder after
Israel extradited the I.R.A. terrorist.
On January 15, 1998, the Bomber was extradited to the United
States and charged with the unlawful discharge of an explosive. On
January 17, 1998, Israel extradited the I.R.A. terrorist to Great Britain. On
January 18, 1998, under pressure from the P.L.O. who threatened to pull
out of the peace talks, the United States charged the Bomber with
murder.
To illustrate how judicial activism could interfere in this sphere of
foreign relations, consider the following. On January 18, 1998, the United
States brought the Bomber before the Second Circuit Court in New York,
at which time the government formally added the charge of murder.
However, the Bomber's attorney argued that such an additional charge
violated the doctrine of specialty. The court agreed without inquiring into
the reasons why the executive branch wanted the Bomber charged with
murder. Without any objection having been made by Britain on behalf of
the Bomber,' the court dismissed the charge. On January 19, 1998, the
P.L.O. pulled out of the peace negotiations with Israel. Yassir Arafat,
speaking on behalf of the P.L.O., stated that because the United States
broke its promise to prosecute the Bomber for murder, the P.L.O. would
no longer participate in any negotiations with Israel in which the United
States played any part.
The above hypothetical underscores several problems with allowing
the judiciary to grant individuals standing to assert treaty violations. First,
' Several circuits have held that in the absence of a protest from the extraditing
state, an individual should not be able to allege an extradition treaty violation. See
United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 994, 1249 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that where no
party to a treaty protests a treaty violation, an individual lacks standing to raise the
treaty as a basis for challenging the court's jurisdiction); Miro, 29 F.3d at 200;
Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 584; Berenguer, 473 F. Supp. at 1197; Matta-Ballesteros, 896
F.2d at 259.
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if the above scenario occurred, which is not unimaginable, the president's
negotiating power abroad could be weakened. The court's actions, based
upon jurisprudential concerns rather than concerns for foreign relations,
would cause the president's promise to Yassir Arafat to be broken. Now,
future negotiations between the United States, Israel, and the P.L.O.
would be more difficult because the United States had failed to carry out
its promised course of action with respect to the Bomber. Second, judicial
abrogation of executive authority could lead to embarrassment, both
domestically and internationally.' Again, the court's primary incentive
is to promote jurisprudential fairness to the individual, a concern quite
different from that of the executive branch. The resultant power struggle
created by inapposite incentives consequently would lead to the inability
of the United States to fulfill its promise to Yassir Arafat which in turn
makes the president look as if he could not effectively conduct foreign
diplomacy. Finally, judicial activism in treaty enforcement would preclude
the United States from speaking with one voice in matters of national
urgency.' The conduct of foreign relations, both in the actual negotia-
tions stage and later in the enforcement stage requires continuity. As we
have seen, critical negotiations between the United States, Israel, and the
P.L.O. could break off because the executive did not live up to his
promise to Yassir Arafat. In this case, continuity between the executive
and the judiciary was critical. In conclusion, if agreements between the
executive branch of the U.S. government and foreign nations are subject
to judicial interpretation, as in the hypothetical above, then the president's
foreign policy could be unconstitutionally trumped by an overreaching
federal judiciary. As a result, U.S. foreign policy would be unsound. "The
courts should not undercut the elected branches by volunteering their own
potentially conflicting opinions on what international law requires."'
B. Institutional Competency
Another question "concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions
to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of
international relations."89 The president, a popularly elected official, is
' United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("It is
quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment
- perhaps serious embarrassment - is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved [the president must be afforded] a degree of discretion and freedom . .. ").
'7 See id. at 319 ("The nature of transactions with foreign nations ... requires
caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and
dispatch.").
s Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 2290.
89 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). The doctrine
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directly responsible to the electorate.' Moreover, he is constitutionally
responsible for engaging in negotiations with foreign nations on matters
directly affecting all U.S. citizens.91 Such negotiations encompass areas
like treaty agreements on trade, immigration, and extradition.' The presi-
dent necessarily has the physical resources to engage in such negotiations
on a regular and often protracted basis. By extension, the president has
practical experience and technical expertise in foreign relations. On the
other hand, the federal judiciary, a non-elected branch of government, is
isolated within the domestic confines of the United States. It does not
have the institutional capacity or the constitutional mandate to enter into
relations with foreign nations.' By extension, this branch does not have
practical or technical expertise in the area of foreign relations.94 There-
fore, the best interests of U.S. foreign relations are protected and promot-
ed when the federal judiciary defers to the president on matters implicat-
ing U.S. foreign relations. The judiciary should thus defer to the president
on matters involving treaty enforcement.
of separation of powers' "continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Gov-
ernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." Id. at 427-28. See Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 805 (1987) (stating that the separation of powers doc-
trine is necessary to prevent "the virtually limitless spread of judicial authority."); see,
e.g., International Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1358-61 (9th Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1292-93 (3d. Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77-79 (2d. Cir. 1977);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 605-08 (9th
Cir. 1976).
90 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 3.
91 See id.
9 See id. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
" See id. By negative inference, that which is committed solely to one branch of
government is not committed to a discordant branch.
94
[Tihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of
the government[.] ... They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1947) (J. Field).
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V. TREATIES Do NOT NECEsSARILY CREATE RIGHTS PRIVATELY
ENFORCEABLE IN U.S. COURTS
Much of this Note is based on the premise that in most situations,
individuals should not be given standing to assert violations of specialty.
However, this premise is not so rigid as to foreclose the possibility that
under certain conditions individuals should be afforded standing. However,
individuals should be given standing to assert violations of specialty only
when the provisions of the extradition treaty expressly authorize such a
right.
The federal courts rely primarily upon three canons of treaty con-
struction. First, some courts adhere to the view that treaties should be
construed "liberally and in good faith." 5 In Geofroy v. Riggs, Justice
Field noted that:
It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they
shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of
the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. As they are
contracts between independent nations, in their construction words are to
be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of
nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them
by local law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended . . ..
David J. Bederman, Professor of Law at Emory University, argues that
this canon of construction, does not invite the court to determine the
intent of the signatories.' However, looking at the Geofroy opinion,
Justice Field expressly states that treaties "shall be liberally construed, so
as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties . . . ."' The key
term here is "apparent intention." If the federal judiciary is encouraged
to give meaning to treaties based on what they believe is the drafters'
"apparent intention,"'"1 the actual intent of the drafters, which can usu-
ally be found by strict adherence to the actual text of the treaty may in
fact be lost.
The second canon of treaty construction, which resembles the
aforementioned canon, calls for the federal judiciary to effectuate the
9 David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 U.C.L.A. L.
RV. 953, 966 (1994) (providing a comprehensive overview of the three primary treaty
interpretative methods).
9 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1890)).
9 Bederman, supra note 95, at 967-68.





intent of the signatory nations."' Courts using this canon of treaty con-
struction attempt to determine the intent of the signatories by closely
examining the negotiating history of the parties and any post-ratification
practices." However, this canon works smoothly only when the legis-
lative history of the particular treaty is unambiguous."m If ambiguity in
the legislative history exists, the court could necessarily resort to injecting
its subjective opinion as to the signatories' intent.
The third canon of treaty construction requires the federal judiciary
to closely examine the actual text of the treaty to determine its mean-
ing." Lending support to this canon of treaty construction are those
such as Emmer De Vattel, who stated that "[ill n'est pas permis
d'interpreter ce qui n'a pas besoin d'interpretation or it is not permissible
to interpret what has no need of interpretation."" 5
The U.S. federal courts should adopt the textualist canon of treaty
construction because it is practicable. It does not force the court to
subjectively inject its "best guess" as to the signatory's "apparent"
intentions. Simply put, it forces the federal courts to defer to the branch
of government that is constitutionally mandated to make treaties.
Critics may argue, however, that the U.S. Constitution gives the
judiciary free reign with respect to treaty interpretation." This argn-
,o1 Bederman, supra note 95, at 970.
0 See id. at 971. (describing several negotiating materials that litigants use to
support their interpretation of relevant treaties, including "statements and speeches by
delegates at international codification conferences and renditions of successive drafts of
provisions").
'" See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 155 (1993) (stating that "the
biggest possible pitfall in the use of legislative history [for a treaty is] what we do
when the legislative history is [itself] ambiguous?').
,04 Id. at 964-65. Those using this canon of treaty construction are called textualists.
Id. at 964.
,01 Id. at 964 (citing 2 EMMER DE VATTE.L, LE DRorr DEs GENS Ou PRINcn'as DE
LA Loi NATURELLE §§ 263-461, at 1565-57, 1 EMMER DE VATTEL, CLAssIcS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (James B. Scott ed., 1916)). See Maximov v. United States, 373
U.S. 49, 55 (1963) (stating that "[wie cannot . . . read the treaty to accord unintended
benefits inconsistent with its words . ... '); Bederman, supra note 99, at 965 (stating
that the "unfortunate tendency to deviate from the text [of treaties] has persisted,
despite Supreme Court pronouncements that if a treaty's language is clear, no other
means of interpretation may be employed").
o U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.'); U.S. CoNsT. art. m, § 2, cl. 1 ("'The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under . . Treaties made, or which shall
be made .... .); U.S. CONST. art. VI., cI. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
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ment, however, is incomplete, and fails to consider the separation of
powers envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution who gave the
president sole responsibility for foreign relations. It is true that treaties are
the supreme law of the land when made under the authority of the United
States pursuant to the Constitution. However, the federal judiciary should
not grant individuals standing unless the treaty "contain[s] provisions
which confer certain rights upon... citizens ... which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties in the courts of [the United
States] .. .
VI. CONCLUSION
Individuals have historically played a limited role in the international
law forum. Although Rauscher held that an individual should have
standing to assert specialty, the decision was poorly rationalized and sig-
nificantly departed from established law. Furthermore, Rauscher itself is
internally inconsistent. It quotes language from Head Money Cases which
held that treaties can expressly confer rights upon individuals, but then
fails to examine the treaty at issue for such language conferring standing
to assert specialty. A textual examination of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty shows that the drafters did not expressly provide for such a right.
Moreover, a separation of powers conflict can result when courts
give individuals standing to assert specialty. To prevent such a conflict,
the federal judiciary should confer standing upon individuals to assert
specialty only when the provisions of an extradition treaty expressly
authorize such a right.
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land .... ).
"o Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886).
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